Secure Lossy Source Coding with Side Information at the Decoders

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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Introduction



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Introduction



Tradeoff: Min. R + Min. D + Max. Δ

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Introduction





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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Outline



- 2 Special Cases of Interest
 - Lossless Secure Source Coding
 - Bob Has Less Noisy SI Than Eve
- 3 Sketch of the Proof
 - Achievability
 - Converse
- 4 Application Example

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Definitions

 \blacksquare \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{E} : three finite sets

■ $(A_i, B_i, E_i)_{i \ge 1}$: i.i.d random variables on $\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{B} \times \mathcal{E}$ with known joint distribution p(a, b, e)

■ $d : A \times A \rightarrow [0; d_{max}]$: a finite distortion measure

An (n, R)-code for source coding in this setup is defined by

- An encoding function at Alice $f : \mathcal{A}^n \to \{1, \dots, 2^{nR}\}$
- A decoding function at Bob $g: \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR}\} \times \mathcal{B}^n \to \mathcal{A}^n$

Definitions (cont.)



A tuple $(R, D, \Delta) \in \mathbb{R}^3_+$ is achievable if, for any $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists an $(n, R + \varepsilon)$ -code (f, g) such that:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[d(A^n, g(f(A^n), B^n))\right] \leq D + \varepsilon$$
$$\frac{1}{n} H(A^n | f(A^n), E^n) \geq \Delta - \varepsilon$$

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Main Result

Theorem (Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region) (R, D, Δ) is achievablei.f.f.there existsets \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V} $r.v. U \text{ on } \mathcal{U}, V \text{ on } \mathcal{V}$ a function $\hat{A}: \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$

such that U - V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain

$$R \geq I(V;A|B)$$

$$D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$$

$$\Delta \leq [H(A|VB) + I(A;B|U) - I(A;E|U)]_{+}$$

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Main Result

Theorem (Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region) (R, D, Δ) is achievablei.f.f.there exist

■ sets \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V} $\|\mathcal{U}\| \le \|\mathcal{A}\| + 2, \|\mathcal{V}\| \le (\|\mathcal{A}\| + 2)(\|\mathcal{A}\| + 1)$ •

$$\blacksquare r.v. U on \mathcal{U}, V on \mathcal{V}$$

• a function $\hat{A} : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$

such that U - V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain

$$R \geq I(V;A|B)$$

$$D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$$

$$\Delta \leq \left[H(A|VB) + I(A;B|U) - I(A;E|U) \right]$$

Outline

Definitions and Main Result

Special Cases of Interest
 Lossless Secure Source Coding
 Bob Has Less Noisy SI Than Eve

3 Sketch of the Proof

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- Converse

4 Application Example

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Lossless Secure Source Coding (D = 0)

Corollary (Prabhakaran2007,Gunduz2008) $(R, 0, \Delta)$ is achievable i.f.f. there exist a set \mathcal{U} a r.v. U on \mathcal{U} such that U - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain $R \ge H(A|B)$ $\Delta \le \left[I(A; B|U) - I(A; E|U)\right]_{+}$

Set V = A in the main theorem

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Outline

Definitions and Main Result

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B is Less Noisy Than *E*

Assumption $I(U;B) \ge I(U;E)$ for each r.v. U s.t. U - A - (B,E) form a MC

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B is Less Noisy Than *E*

Assumption $I(U;B) \ge I(U;E)$ for each r.v. U s.t. U - A - (B,E) form a MC Corollary (R, D, Δ) is achievable *i.f.f.* there exist a r.v. V on some set V • a function $\hat{A} : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$ such that V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain $R \geq I(V;A|B)$ $D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$ $\Delta \leq \left[H(A|VB) + I(A;B) - I(A;E) \right]_{+}$

B is Less Noisy Than E

Corollary (R, D, Δ) is achievable *i.f.f.* there exist a r.v. V on some set V • a function $\hat{A}: \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$ such that V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain $R \geq I(V;A|B)$ $D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$ $\Delta \leq \left[H(A|VB) + I(A;B) - I(A;E) \right]_{\perp}$

- Set U = cst in the main theorem
- Wyner-Ziv coding achieves the optimal performance

Achievability

Outline



Special Cases of Interest
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 Bob Has Less Noisy SI Than Eve

Sketch of the Proof Achievability

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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

$$U - V - A - (B, E)$$
 form a Markov chain

1 a simple binning operation to transmit
$$U$$
 (message r_1)

 $R_1 > I(U;A|B)$

2 a Wyner–Ziv coding to transmit A with SI (U, B) at Bob (message r₂)

 $R_2 > I(V; A | UB)$

 \Rightarrow Sufficient condition:

 $R_1 + R_2 > I(V;A|B)$

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Achievability

Distortion at Bob

Bob can decode U^n and V^n from message (r_1, r_2) and SI B^n

$$\mathbb{E}\left[d(A^n, g(f(A^n), B^n))\right] \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{E}\left[d(A_i, g_i(V^n, B^n))\right]$$
$$= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{E}\left[d(A_i, \hat{A}(V_i, B_i))\right]$$
$$= \mathbb{E}\left[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))\right]$$

Sufficient condition:

$$D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$$

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Equivocation Rate at Eve

Eve receives messsage (r_1, r_2) and SI E^n

$$\frac{1}{n} H(A^{n} | f(A^{n}) E^{n}) = \frac{1}{n} H(A^{n} | r_{1} r_{2} E^{n})$$

$$= \frac{1}{n} \Big[H(A^{n}) - I(A^{n}; r_{1} E^{n}) - I(A^{n}; r_{2} | r_{1} E^{n}) \Big]$$

$$I(\cdot; \cdot | \cdot) \le H(\cdot | \cdot) \le H(\cdot) \Big\} \ge \frac{1}{n} \Big[H(A^{n}) - I(A^{n}; U^{n} E^{n}) - H(r_{2}) \Big]$$
i.i.d. r.v., $r_{2} \in \{1, ..., 2^{nR_{2}}\} \ge H(A | UE) - R_{2}$

Sufficient condition:

$$\Delta \leq \left[H(A|UE) - R_2 \right]_+$$

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Main Result

Theorem (Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region) (R, D, Δ) is achievable (\leftarrow) there exist sets U. V \blacksquare r.v. U on \mathcal{U} , V on \mathcal{V} • a function $\hat{A}: \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$ such that U - V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain $R \geq I(V;A|B)$ $D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$ $\Delta \leq \left[H(A|VB) + I(A;B|U) - I(A;E|U) \right]_{+}$

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Converse

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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Converse

Definitions

- An achievable tuple: (R, D, Δ)
- Transmitted message: $W = f(A^n)$

Auxiliary random variables:

$$U_i = (W, B_{i+1}^n, E^{i-1})$$

$$V_i = (W, A^{i-1}, B^{i-1}, B_{i+1}^n, E^{i-1})$$

 \blacksquare $U_i - V_i - A_i - (B_i, E_i)$ form a Markov chain

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$$\begin{split} nR &\geq H(W) \\ &= I(W; A^n B^n E^n) \\ &\geq I(W; A^n E^n | B^n) \\ \left\{ \text{chain rule} \right\} &= \sum_{i=1}^n I(W; A_i E_i | A^{i-1} B^n E^{i-1}) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n I(WA^{i-1} B^{i-1} B^n_{i+1} E^{i-1}; A_i E_i | B_i) \\ &- I(A^{i-1} B^{i-1} B^n_{i+1} E^{i-1}; A_i E_i | B_i) \\ \left\{ \text{indep. across time} \right\} &\geq \sum_{i=1}^n I(V_i; A_i | B_i) \end{split}$$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Distortion at Bob

Bob reconstructs $g(W, B^n)$

$$\blacksquare V_i = (W, A^{i-1}, B^{i-1}, B^n_{i+1}, E^{i-1})$$

$$\hat{A}_i(V_i, B_i) \triangleq g_i(W, B^{i-1}, B_i, B^n_{i+1})$$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Converse

Distortion at Bob

Bob reconstructs $g(W, B^n)$

$$V_i = (W, A^{i-1}, B^{i-1}, B^n_{i+1}, E^{i-1})$$

$$\hat{A}_i(V_i, B_i) \triangleq g_i(W, B^{i-1}, B_i, B^n_{i+1})$$

Component-wise mean distortion:

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[d(A^n, g(f(A^n), B^n))\Big] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{E}\Big[d(A_i, \hat{A}_i(V_i, B_i))\Big]$$

$$\leq D$$

Equivocation Rate at Eve

$$H(A^n|WE^n) = H(A^n|W) - I(A^n;E^n|W)$$

 $\{W - A^n - (B^n, E^n)\} = H(A^n | WB^n) + I(A^n; B^n) - I(W; B^n) - I(A^n; E^n) + I(W; E^n)$

$$\{\text{chain rule}\} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(A_i | W\!A^{i-1}B^n) + I(A_i; B_i) - I(A_i; E_i) - I(W\!B_{i+1}^n; B_i) + I(W\!E^{i-1}; E_i) \}$$

$$\{\text{Csiszar-Körner}\} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(A_i | W\!A^{i-1}B_{i-1}B_iB_{i+1}^n E^{i-1}) + I(A_i; B_i) - I(A_i; E_i) + I(E_i; W\!B_{i+1}^n E^{i-1}) - I(B_i; W\!B_{i+1}^n E^{i-1}) \}$$

$$\left\{U_i - A_i - (B_i, E_i)\right\} = \sum_{i=1}^n H(A_i | V_i B_i) + I(A_i; B_i | U_i) - I(A_i; E_i | U_i)$$

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Main Result



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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders



Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Neither Bob nor Eve is a lessnoisy decoder for all values of (p, ε) :



Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Neither Bob nor Eve is a lessnoisy decoder for all values of (p, ε) :



Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders



- distortion *d*: Hamming distance
- source A: uniformly distributed

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Main Result

Theorem (Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region) (R, D, Δ) is achievablei.f.f.there exist

- sets \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V} $\|\mathcal{U}\| \le \|\mathcal{A}\| + 2, \|\mathcal{V}\| \le (\|\mathcal{A}\| + 2)(\|\mathcal{A}\| + 1)$
- $\blacksquare r.v. U on U, V on V$
- a function $\hat{A} : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$

such that U - V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain

$$R \geq I(V;A|B)$$

$$D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$$

$$\Delta \leq \left[H(A|VB) + I(A;B|U) - I(A;E|U) \right]$$

Main Result

Theorem (Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region) (R, D, Δ) is achievablei.f.f.there exist

- $\blacksquare r.v. U on \mathcal{U}, V on \mathcal{V}$
- a function $\hat{A} : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$

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$$R \geq I(V;A|B)$$

$$D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A,\hat{A}(V,B))]$$

$$\Delta \leq [H(A|VB) + I(A;B|U) - I(A;E|U)]$$

Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region

Proposition (R, D, Δ) is achievable *i.f.f.* there exist $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1/2]$ such that $R \geq \varepsilon (1 - h_2(\alpha)),$ $D \geq \varepsilon \alpha,$ $\Delta \leq [\varepsilon h_2(\alpha) + (1 - \varepsilon) h_2(\alpha \star \beta) - h_2(p \star \alpha \star \beta) + h_2(p)]_+.$

■
$$a \star b = a(1-b) + (1-a)b$$

■ $h_2(x) = -x \log_2(x) - (1-x) \log_2(1-x)$

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Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region

Proposition

 (R, D, Δ) is achievable *i.f.f.*

there exist $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1/2]$ such that

$$\begin{array}{ll} R & \geq & \varepsilon \left(1 - h_2(\alpha) \right) \,, \\ D & \geq & \varepsilon \,\alpha \,, \\ \Delta & \leq & \left[\varepsilon \, h_2(\alpha) + (1 - \varepsilon) \, h_2(\alpha \star \beta) - h_2(p \star \alpha \star \beta) + h_2(p) \right]_+ \end{array}$$



Illustration



Equivocation rate at Eve Δ as a function of the distortion at Bob D

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Summary and Discussion

 Complete single-letter characterization of the rate-distortion-equivocation region

Binary sources with BEC and BSC Side Informations

Future work:

- Vector Gaussian sources and side informations
- Rate-distortion-distortion region

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Outline



5 Appendix

- Eve Has Less Noisy SI Than Bob
- Proof of Achievability
- Proof of Converse
- Cardinality Bounds

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

E is Less Noisy Than B

Corollary (R, D, Δ) is achievable *i.f.f.* there exist a r.v. V on some set V **a** function $\hat{A} : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$ such that V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain $R \geq I(V;A|B)$ $D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$ $\Delta \leq H(A|VE)$

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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

E is Less Noisy Than B

Corollary (R, D, Δ) is achievable *i.f.f.* there exist a r.v. V on some set V • a function $\hat{A} : \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$ such that V - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain $R \geq I(V;A|B)$ $D \geq \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$ $\Delta \leq H(A|VE)$

Set U = V in the main theorem

Wyner-Ziv coding achieves the optimal performance

Outline



5 Appendix

- Eve Has Less Noisy SI Than Bob
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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Codebook generation

- **1** a simple binning operation to transmit U
- 2 a Wyner–Ziv coding to transmit A with SI (U, B) at Bob

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Codebook generation

- **1** a simple binning operation to transmit U
- 2 a Wyner–Ziv coding to transmit A with SI (U, B) at Bob
 - randomly pick 2^{nS_1} sequences $u^n(s_1)$ from $T^n_{\epsilon}(U)$
 - divide them into 2^{nR_1} equal-size bins $\{B_1(r_1)\}_{r_1 \in \{1, \dots, 2^{nR_1}\}}$

Then, for each codeword $u^n(s_1)$,

- randomly pick 2^{nS_2} sequences $v^n(s_1, s_2)$ from $T^n_{\epsilon}(V|u^n(s_1))$
- divide them into 2^{nR_2} equal-size bins $\{B_2(s_1, r_2)\}_{r_2 \in \{1, \dots, 2^{nR_2}\}}$

Encoding

- a simple binning operation to transmit U
- 2 a Wyner–Ziv coding to transmit A with SI (U, B) at Bob

Sequence A^n is produced at Alice

- look for a codeword $u^n(s_1)$ s.t. $(u^n(s_1), A^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(U, A)$
- \rightarrow bin $B_1(r_1)$
- look for a codeword $v^n(s_1, s_2)$ s.t. $(v^n(s_2), A^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(V, A | u^n(s_1))$
- \rightarrow bin $B_2(s_1, r_2)$
 - send the message $f(A^n) \triangleq (r_1, r_2)$

Proof of Achievability

Encoding

- 1 a simple binning operation to transmit U
- 2 a Wyner–Ziv coding to transmit A with SI (U, B) at Bob

Sequence A^n is produced at Alice

- look for a codeword $u^n(s_1)$ s.t. $(u^n(s_1), A^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(U, A)$
- \rightarrow bin $B_1(r_1)$

$$S_1 > I(U;A)$$

look for a codeword $v^n(s_1, s_2)$ s.t. $(v^n(s_2), A^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(V, A | u^n(s_1))$

 \rightarrow bin $B_2(s_1, r_2)$ $S_2 > I(V; A|U)$

send the message $f(A^n) \triangleq (r_1, r_2)$

Proof of Achievability

Decoding

a simple binning operation to transmit U
 a Wyner–Ziv coding to transmit A with SI (U, B) at Bob

Bob receives (r_1, r_2) from Alice and his SI sequence B^n

look for the unique codeword $u^n(s_1) \in B_1(r_1)$ s.t.

 $(u^n(s_1), B^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(U, B)$

■ look for the unique codeword $v^n(s_1, s_2) \in B_2(s_1, r_2)$ s.t. $(v^n(s_1, s_2), B^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(V, B|u^n(s_1))$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Proof of Achievability

Decoding

a simple binning operation to transmit U
 a Wyner–Ziv coding to transmit A with SI (U, B) at Bob

Bob receives (r_1, r_2) from Alice and his SI sequence B^n

look for the unique codeword $u^n(s_1) \in B_1(r_1)$ s.t.

 $(u^n(s_1), B^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(U, B) \qquad \qquad S_1 - R_1 < I(U; B)$

■ look for the unique codeword $v^n(s_1, s_2) \in B_2(s_1, r_2)$ s.t. $(v^n(s_1, s_2), B^n) \in T^n_{\epsilon}(V, B|u^n(s_1))$ $S_2 - R_2 < I(V; B|U)$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Markov Chain
$$U - V - A - (B, E)$$

Encoding and decoding constraints:

$$S_1 > I(U;A)$$

 $S_2 > I(V;A|U)$
 $S_1 - R_1 < I(U;B)$
 $S_2 - R_2 < I(V;B|U)$

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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Markov Chain U - V - A - (B, E)

Encoding and decoding constraints:

 $R_1 > I(U;A|B)$ $R_2 > I(V;A|UB)$

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Markov Chain U - V - A - (B, E)

Encoding and decoding constraints:

 $R_1 > I(U;A|B)$ $R_2 > I(V;A|UB)$

Sufficient condition:

 $R_1 + R_2 > I(V;A|B)$

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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Proof of Converse

Outline



5 Appendix

- Eve Has Less Noisy SI Than Bob
- Proof of Achievability

Proof of Converse

Cardinality Bounds

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Definition of New Random Variables

$$R \geq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(\mathbf{V}_{i}; A_{i} | B_{i})$$

$$D \geq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \Big[d(A_{i}, \hat{A}_{i}(\mathbf{V}_{i}, B_{i})) \Big]$$

$$\Delta \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(A_{i} | \mathbf{V}_{i} B_{i}) + I(A_{i}; B_{i} | \mathbf{U}_{i}) - I(A_{i}; E_{i} | \mathbf{U}_{i})$$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Definition of New Random Variables

$$R \geq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(\mathbf{V}_{i}; A_{i} | B_{i})$$

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$$\Delta \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(A_{i} | \mathbf{V}_{i} B_{i}) + I(A_{i}; B_{i} | \mathbf{U}_{i}) - I(A_{i}; E_{i} | \mathbf{U}_{i})$$

Define:

an independent r.v. Q unif. distributed over $\{1, \ldots, n\}$

$$\blacksquare A = A_Q, \quad B = B_Q, \quad E = E_Q, \quad U = (Q, U_Q), \quad V = (Q, V_Q)$$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Definition of New Random Variables

$$R \geq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(\mathbf{V}_{i}; A_{i} | B_{i})$$

$$D \geq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \Big[d(A_{i}, \hat{A}_{i}(\mathbf{V}_{i}, B_{i})) \Big]$$

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Define:

an independent r.v. Q unif. distributed over $\{1, \ldots, n\}$

$$A = A_Q, \quad B = B_Q, \quad E = E_Q, \quad U = (Q, U_Q), \quad V = (Q, V_Q)$$

Then:

$$U - V - A - (B, E)$$
 form a Markov chain

 $(A, B, E) \sim p(a, b, e)$

Appendix



$$R \geq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_i; A_i | B_i)$$

$$= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_Q; A_Q | B_Q, Q = i)$$

$$= I(V_Q; A_Q | B_Q, Q)$$

$$= I(QV_Q; A_Q | B_Q)$$

= I(V;A|B)

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Distortion at Bob

$$D \geq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \Big[d(A_i, \hat{A}_i(V_i, B_i)) \Big]$$

$$= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \Big[d(A_Q, \hat{A}_Q(V_Q, B_Q)) \mid Q = i \Big]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \Big[d(A_Q, \hat{A}_Q(V_Q, B_Q)) \Big]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \Big[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B)) \Big]$$

where

$$\hat{A}(V,B) = \hat{A}(Q,V_Q,B_Q) \triangleq \hat{A}_Q(V_Q,B_Q)$$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Equivocation Level at Eve

$$\Delta \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(A_i | V_i B_i) + I(A_i; B_i | U_i) - I(A_i; E_i | U_i)$$

= $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(A_Q | V_Q B_Q, Q = i)$
+ $I(A_Q; B_Q | U_Q, Q = i) - I(A_Q; E_Q | U_Q, Q = i)$

- $= H(A_{\mathcal{Q}}|V_{\mathcal{Q}}B_{\mathcal{Q}},\mathcal{Q}) + I(A_{\mathcal{Q}};B_{\mathcal{Q}}|U_{\mathcal{Q}},\mathcal{Q}) I(A_{\mathcal{Q}};E_{\mathcal{Q}}|U_{\mathcal{Q}},\mathcal{Q})$
- = H(A|VB) + I(A;B|U) I(A;E|U)

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Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

Cardinality Bounds

Outline



5 Appendix

- Eve Has Less Noisy SI Than Bob
- Proof of Achievability
- Proof of Converse
- Cardinality Bounds

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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Cardinality Bounds

$$R \hspace{2mm} \geq \hspace{2mm} H(A|B) - H(AB|V) + H(B|V)$$

$$D \geq \mathbb{E}\left[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))\right]$$

$$\Delta \leq \left[H(AB|V) - H(B|V) + I(A;B|U) - I(A;E|U)
ight]$$

Follow standard arguments¹:

- identify continuous functions of prob. distributions
- use Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem to define new admissible random variables

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¹ [A. El Gamal and Y.-H. Kim. Lecture Notes on Netw IT. arXiv:1001.3404]

 $\|A\| + 2$ continuous functions of p(v|u):

$$\begin{cases} p(a|u) = \mathbb{E}[p(a|V)|U = u] \\ H(AB|V, U = u) - H(B|V, U = u) = H(VAB|U = u) - H(VB|U = u) \\ \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))|U = u] \\ I(A; B|U = u) - I(A; E|U = u) \end{cases}$$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

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 $\|A\| + 2$ continuous functions of p(v|u):

$$\begin{cases} p(a|u) = \mathbb{E}[p(a|V)|U = u] \\ H(AB|V, U = u) - H(B|V, U = u) = H(VAB|U = u) - H(VB|U = u) \\ \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))|U = u] \\ I(A; B|U = u) - I(A; E|U = u) \end{cases}$$

Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem \Rightarrow there exist:

• a set \mathcal{U}' with $\|\mathcal{U}'\| \le \|\mathcal{A}\| + 2$

a r.v. U' on \mathcal{U}' s.t. p(a), H(AB|V) - H(B|V), $\mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$ and I(A; B|U) - I(A; E|U) are preserved

For each $u' \in U'$, ||A|| + 1 continuous functions of p(a|u', v):

$$\begin{cases} p(a|u', v) \\ H(AB|U' = u', V = v) - H(B|U' = u', V = v) \\ \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))|U' = u', V = v] \end{cases}$$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

For each $u' \in U'$, ||A|| + 1 continuous functions of p(a|u', v):

$$\begin{cases} p(a|u', v) \\ H(AB|U' = u', V = v) - H(B|U' = u', V = v) \\ \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))|U' = u', V = v] \end{cases}$$

Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem \Rightarrow there exist:

■ a set \mathcal{V}' with $\|\mathcal{V}'\| \le \|\mathcal{A}\| + 1$ ■ for each $u' \in \mathcal{U}'$, a r.v. $V'|\{U' = u'\}$ on \mathcal{V}' a function $\hat{A}'_{u'} : \mathcal{V}' \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$ s.t. p(a|u'), H(AB|U' = u', V) - H(B|U' = u', V) and $\mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))|U' = u']$ are preserved.

- set $\mathcal{V}'' = \mathcal{U}' \times \mathcal{V}'$
- random variable V'' = (U', V')
- $\blacksquare \text{ fun. } \hat{A}'': \mathcal{V}'' \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A} \text{ by } \hat{A}''(v'', b) = \hat{A}''(u', v', b) \triangleq \hat{A}'_{u'}(v', b)$

U' - V'' - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

- set $\mathcal{V}'' = \mathcal{U}' \times \mathcal{V}'$
- random variable V'' = (U', V')
- $\blacksquare \text{ fun. } \hat{A}'': \mathcal{V}'' \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A} \text{ by } \hat{A}''(v'', b) = \hat{A}''(u', v', b) \triangleq \hat{A}'_{u'}(v', b)$

U' - V'' - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain

 $\begin{aligned} H(AB|V'') - H(B|V'') &= H(AB|U',V') - H(B|U',V') \\ &= H(AB|U',V) - H(B|U',V) \\ &= H(AB|V) - H(B|V) \end{aligned}$

Secure Lossy Source Coding with SI at the Decoders

- set $\mathcal{V}'' = \mathcal{U}' \times \mathcal{V}'$
- random variable V'' = (U', V')
- $\blacksquare \text{ fun. } \hat{A}'': \mathcal{V}'' \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A} \text{ by } \hat{A}''(v'', b) = \hat{A}''(u', v', b) \triangleq \hat{A}'_{u'}(v', b)$

$$U' - V'' - A - (B, E)$$
 form a Markov chain

$$\begin{aligned} H(AB|V'') - H(B|V'') &= H(AB|V) - H(B|V) \\ \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}''(V'', B))] &= \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}'_{U'}(V', B))] \\ &= \mathbb{E}\Big[\mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}'_{U'}(V', B))|U']\Big] \\ &= \mathbb{E}\Big[\mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))|U']\Big] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))] \end{aligned}$$

- $\blacksquare \text{ set } \mathcal{V}'' = \mathcal{U}' \times \mathcal{V}' \quad \|\mathcal{V}''\| \le (\|\mathcal{A}\| + 2)(\|\mathcal{A}\| + 1)$
- random variable V'' = (U', V')
- $\blacksquare \text{ fun. } \hat{A}'': \mathcal{V}'' \times \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A} \text{ by } \hat{A}''(v'', b) = \hat{A}''(u', v', b) \triangleq \hat{A}'_{u'}(v', b)$

U' - V'' - A - (B, E) form a Markov chain

$$H(AB|V'') - H(B|V'') = H(AB|V) - H(B|V)$$
$$\mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}''(V'', B))] = \mathbb{E}[d(A, \hat{A}(V, B))]$$

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